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The Availability of Jury Trials in Copyright Infringement
Cases: Limiting the Scope of the Seventh Amendment
One of the objectives of the architects of modem pleading, 1 and an
oft-expressed goal of legal scholars,2 has been the elimination of the
historical dichotomy between law and equity. The "merger" of the
two ancient legal branches remains incomplete,3 however, in large part
because of the seventh amendment's mandate that "in suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."4 The
amendment has been construed as providing the right to a jury trial in
all civil cases considered to be "at law" at the time of the Constitution's adoption, but as denying this right in all cases considered "in
equity" at that time. 5 Thus, the equitable/legal distinction retains
great importance in civil cases in which the right to jury trial is at
issue.
The problems of characterization and historical analysis involved
in deciding whether a particular cause of action is legal or equitable
are compounded when the legislature· creates new causes of action.
Statutory remedies created after the adoption of the seventh amendment would seem to fall outside the amendment's stricture that the
right to trial by jury shall be "preserved." However, the Supreme
Court has held that a newly created statutory cause of action will
carry with it the right to a jury trial if it can be properly characterized
as "legal" in nature. 6 Thus, the question of whether a modem statutory cause of action entitles the parties to a jury trial often becomes
one of whether the most closely analogous cause of action existing at
the time of the Constitution's adoption in 1791 would have been char1. The first system of code pleading, New York's Field Code, eliminated "the distinction
between actions at law, and suits in equity" and established one form of action, "which shall be
denominated a civil action." E. STASON, B. SHARTEL, & J. REED, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
EQUITY 89 (1953) [hereinafter cited as E. STASON]. This policy was adopted by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Id.
2. See notes 132-35 infra and accompanying text.
3. E. STASON, supra note 1, at 90.
4. In its entirety, the amendment reads: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law." U.S. CoNST. amend. VII.
5. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) ("The phrase 'common law,' found in
[the seventh amendment], is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime
jurisprudence.").
6. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) ("The Seventh Amendment does apply to
actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates
legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law.").
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acterized as "legal" or "equitable." 7
Cases brought pursuant to the federal copyright statute8 present
current examples of the characterization problem posed by newly created causes of action. Because it is frequently difficult for the plaintiff
in a copyright case to prove the exact amount of his or her loss,9 the
copyright statute gives the plaintiff the option of suing for "statutory"
instead of "actual" damages. 10 Under the "statutory" damages provision, the plaintiff need not present any showing of actual loss; 11 the
court is given authority to award as damages any amount it considers
"just," between the limits of $250 and $10,000. 12 The copyright statute engenders little dispute when the plaintiff chooses to pursue actual
damages, which are easily characterized as a legal remedy. 13 The statutory damages remedy, however, escapes such neat classification, for it
combines elements characteristic of both legal and equitable
remedies. 14
This Note addresses the question of whether the statutory damages
remedy provided by the federal copyright statute is properly characterized as equitable or as legal, and consequently whether the remedy
falls within the seventh amendment's jury trial provision. Courts15
and commentators16 disagree about the answers to these questions.
Those who describe the statutory relief as "legal" point out that section 504(c) monetary damages are analogous to other forms of monetary relief, such as debt, which are legal in nature, 17 and that the
7. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the I"ationality of Rational
Decision Making, 10 Nw. U. L. REV. 486, 490-91 (1975).
8. Copyrights Act of 1976, §§ 101-810, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
9. For example, how much money has a plaintiff "lost" if a band infringes his or her copyright in a musical work by playing the work as one of many pieces performed at a concert? See
generally Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1894) (noting difficulty of determining amount of
loss caused by copyright infringement in many cases).
10. See text at note 25 infra.
11. Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 118 (4th Cir. 1981); Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 CoPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 1{ 25,059, at 15,311 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (1982). Section 504(c)(2) raises the damages ceiling for willful
infringement and lowers the damages floor for unknowing infringement.
13. See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 86-115 infra and accompanying text.
15. Compare Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981) (section 504(c)
relief held legal in nature), with Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
(section 504(c) relief to be determined by judge), and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith,
645 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (section 504(c) relief held to be equitable).
16. Compare Patry, The Right to a Jury in Copyright Cases, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SocY. 139
(1981) (advancing the thesis that statutory copyright damages are legal), with 3 NIMMER, NIMMER ON CoPYRIGHT § 14.04[C] (1985) (proposing as "perhaps the better view" that § 504(c)
damages should be awarded by the judge). Other commentary on the question of jury trials in
copyright cases includes: Breuninger, Statutory Damages and Right to Jury Trial in Copyright
Infringement Suits, 24 IDEA 249 (1984); Note, Right to a Jury Trial Under Copyright Act's Statutory Damage Provision, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 800 (1982).
17. Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 1981).
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action's statutory predecessors have historically been considered
legal. 18 Their opponents argue that the large amount of discretion allowed in fixing the level of damages 19 and the "calculation" of damages without regard to "facts" (the usual province of juries) indicate
that the relief was intended to be and should be described as
"equitable."20
This Note argues that statutory copyright damages are properly
regarded as equitable and hence that no right to a jury trial exists in
cases brought to recover such damages. More generally, the Note
maintains that the seventh amendment's distinction between equitable
and legal causes of action has produced irrational consequences, and
proposes that "legal" issues be defined narrowly so as to limit the
scope of the seventh amendment. Part I analyzes the debate over statutory copyright damages, concluding that historical and statutory
construction arguments require these damages to be construed as
legal. Part II examines some of the problems that have resulted from
traditional interpretations of the seventh amendment, and argues that
these problems would be ameliorated by classifying ambiguous causes
of action, such as statutory copyright damages, as equitable relief.

I.

CHARACTERIZATION OF THE STATUTORY DAMAGES REMEDY:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND HISTORICAL .ANALYSIS

In Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 21 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit found that statutory damages under federal copyright
law constituted legal damages, and thus that the defendant was within
his rights in demanding a jury trial. 22 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit stands alone among the five circuits that have considered the issue. 23 The disagreement among the circuits extends to both issues
18. Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 1981); Patry, supra note 16,
at 147-94.
19. See, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 1957),
20. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC, (CCH)
1125,059 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
21. 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981).
22. 653 F.2d at 120-21.
23. Reaching results opposite to that of Gnossos were Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.
1983) (per curiam); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith, 645 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1977); and Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1957). The last two cases
interpreted the statutory damages provision of the 1909 Copyright Act, which was identical, for
present purposes, to the statutory damages provision of the 1976 Act.
Unfortunately, none of the Courts of Appeals that held statutory copyright relief to be equitable devoted any appreciable analysis to the question. The Oboler court simply stated its conclusion without precedential support or elaboration. 714 F.2d at 213. The Fifth Circuit in Frith
confined its analysis to a list of citations of cases on both sides, concluding simply that the
"whole case is equitable." 645 F.2d at 7. The Ninth Circuit based its decision in Sid & Marty
Krofft entirely on the statute's use of the word "court," 562 F.2d at 1177, which the Supreme
Court has found, in another context, to be an improper basis for decision. See notes 27-30 infra
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raised by the attempt to characterize statutory copyright damages:
first, whether Congress meant to provide for trial by jury in statutory
damage cases; and second, whether the seventh amendment requires
that a jury be provided, irrespective of congressional intent. 24
A. Statutory Construction

Section 504(c) of the 1976 Copyrights Act, which provides for
"statutory" relief, reads in pertinent part:
[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is
rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of
statutory damages . . . in a sum of not less than $250 or more than
$10,000 as the court considers just.25

Courts and commentators on both sides of the legal/equitable debate
have attempted to construe the language and intent of section 504(c)
to their advantage. In the final analysis, however, the debate over statutory construction remains unresolved.
Several courts have focused on the use of the word "court" in section 504(c), concluding that Congress intended the issue of statutory
relief to be tried before a judge. 26 In Gnossos, however, the Fourth
Circuit found such reasoning unpersuasive. The Gnossos court cited a
Supreme Court decision27 in which a statutory remedy28 directed by
Congress to be administered by the "court" was nonetheless held legal
in nature. 29 The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that the word "court"
is a generic term that can denote either the judge or the jury.30 The
and accompanying text. The Palermo court reasoned simply that the remedy was not punitive,
implying that its equitable character followed largely from that fact. 249 F.2d at 82.
24. In Gnossos, the Fourth Circuit found the evidence of congressional intent regarding the
jury trial issue in§ 504(c) cases to be inconclusive, but held that the seventh amendment provides
a right to trial by jury. 653 F.2d at 119-21. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, relied on
statutory construction in finding no right to jury trial, implicitly holding as well that the seventh
amendment had no application to § 504(c) damages. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (1982).
26. See, e.g., Glazier v. First Media Corp., 532 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D. Del. 1982); Rodgers v.
Breckenridge Hotels Corp., 512 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mo. 1981). See also Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977); Cayman Music, Ltd.
v. Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp. 794 (W.D. Wis. 1975) (interpreting similar language in the 1909
copyright statute). Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (5th ed. 1979) ("The words 'court' and
'judge' . . . are frequently used in statutes as synonymous.").
27. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), cited in Gnossis, 653 F.2d at 119.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1982) allows a private plaintiff alleging a violation of his civil rights
under the Fair Housing Act to bring an action for damages as well as for injunctive relief. Curtis
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 189-90 (1974).
29. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
30. Gnossos, 653 F.2d at 119. This contention is buttressed by the use of the word "court" in
the discussion of actual damage awards in the House Report on the Copyrights Act of 1976.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976). Since the award of actual damages has
always been considered a legal remedy, Congress could not have meant to use the word "court"
other than in its generic sense.
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Gnossos court ignored, however, the statute's use of the word "discretion" in addition to the phrase "as the court considers just."31 Discretion is generally considered to be within the province of the judge, not
the jury, 32 and the use of the word "discretion" in a statute has been
held to be important in characterizing the statute as one providing
equitable relief. 33 Thus, while the Gnossos court was probably correct
in asserting that use of the word "court" is not indicative of Congressional intent, 34 it ignored the plausible argument that other wording in
the statutory damages provision supports the view that Congress intended to provide for equitable relief. 35
A second area of dispute is whether Congress intended to alter the
effect of prior copyright legislation. One commentator, William Patry,
has traced the history of the various federal copyright statutes from
the original copyright act of 1790 to the current statute.36 Patry argues that since statutory copyright relief was demonstrably legal in
nature in the nineteenth century,37 and since subsequent enactments
have left statutory damage provisions substantially unchanged, 38 one
may infer that Congress intended such relief to be considered a legal
31. "As the court considers just" appears in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l), and the word "discretion"
is used with reference to the "court" in § 504(c)(2), the punitive damages provision. In addition,
the legislative history of § 504(c)(l) indicates that Congress intended the "court" to "exercise
discretion in awarding an amount within" the prescribed range of statutory damages. H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1976) (emphasis added).
32. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)
1125,059, at 15,311 (N.D. Ind. 1979) ("[J]uries are not normally thought of as exercising discre•
tion. Their function is to find facts and to apply the law, as it is explained to them, to the
facts."). See also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 2.1, at 28 (1973) (noting
that equity has been defined in terms of "discretion"); Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable
Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 524, 533 (1982) ("discretion ••• has always lain at the heart of
equity jurisdiction"); Winner, The Chancellor's Foot and Environmental Law: A Call for Beller
Reasoned Decisions on Environmental Injunctions, 9 ENvn. L. 477,480 (1979) ("In contrast to
common law judges, chancellors acted with substantial discretion and rarely recorded the reasons for their opinions.").
33. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)
1125,059, at 15,310-11 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
34. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
35. See notes 99-104 & 106-07 infra and accompanying text.
36. See Patry, supra note 16, at 145-93. The history of the pre-1909 acts is also discussed in
notes 62-74 infra and accompanying text.
37. Patry based this premise on the case of Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899), discussed In
Patry, supra note 16, at 169-72. The case involved an action for damages under an 1856 copyright statute that provided minimum damages for infringement of a copyright. Although the
parties waived trial by jury, the report of the case specifically indicates that the action was at law.
175 U.S. at 148. However, it is important to note that the damages sought in Brady are not
completely analogous to modem statutory copyright damages. The plaintiff in Brady sought
actual damages, which required factual proof of Joss. The statutory damages remedy, on the
other hand, is discretionary and may be awarded absent any proof of loss. See text at notes 11-12

supra.
38. See Act of Mar. 2, 1895, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., 28 Stat. 956; Copyright Act of 1909, ch.
320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-804 (1982). Patry is incorrect, however, in his assertion that all subsequent enactments have left statutory damages unchanged. See notes 67-74 infra and accompanying text.
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remedy under the latest copyright enactment. 39 Even if Patry's view is
correct that statutory damages in the nineteenth century were thought
of as legal,40 by 1976 (the date of the most recent copyright enactment) the courts were in disagreement over whether subsequent copyright enactments provided for equitable or legal relief. 41 The three
courts addressing the question in the two decades prior to 1976 held
that statutory damages constituted equitable relief.42 Considering the
judicial confusion as to the nature of statutory copyright damage provisions from the nineteenth century to the present, it is not at all clear
which view of the damage provisions Congress meant to adopt in its
most recent enactment in 1976.43 The history offederal copyright legislation is therefore inconclusive.
Patry further argues that since the statute allows plaintiffs to elect
between actual and statutory damages at any time until judgment is
rendered, the right to a jury trial, which undeniably exists in actions
seeking actual damages,44 must be afforded in suits for statutory damages as well. 45 Otherwise, he argues, the plaintiff would be forced to
elect a remedy when he or she decides whether to demand a jury trial,
a point in the proceedings well before trial. 46 This argument fails,
however, because the statute only guarantees the plaintiff the right to a
late election in switchingfrom actual damages to statutory damages. 47
39. Patry, supra note 16, at 190.
40. In fact, statutory damages in their present form did not exist until 1909. See notes 67-74
infra and accompanying text. Patry makes much of the fact that two nineteenth century copyright cases, Backus v. Gould, 48 U.S. 798 (1849), and Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899), were
originally to have been tried before a jury. (In Brady the parties waived jury trial. 175 U.S. at
151.) But both cases were decided under statutes providing for actual damages, and are therefore
not relevant to the characterization of.statutory "in lieu" damages.
41. Compare Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1957) (no right to
jury trial under the 1909 copyright act), with Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79
F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1977) (litigants have right to jury trial under 1909 statutory copyright
provisions).
·
42. Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 81-82 (1st Cir. 1957); Cayman Music,
Ltd. v. Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp. 794, 797 (W.D. Wis. 1975); Serra v. Matias Photo Shop, 21
F.R.D. 188, 190 (D.P.R. 1954). See also Maloney v. Stone, 171 F. Supp. 29, 31-32 (D. Mass.
1959) (reaching the remarkable conclusion that all copyright damages - both statutory and
actual - are equitable in nature).
43. In interpreting a statutory amendment, it is generally presumed that the legislature that
enacted the amendment was aware of how courts had construed the original act. SUTHERLAND
STAT. CONST. § 22.35 (4th ed. 1972 & Supp. 1985).
44. See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
45. Patry, supra note 16, at 191. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (1982). The relevant statutory
language is quoted in note 47 infra.
46. Patry, supra note 16, at 191.
47. The relevant portion of the statute reads: "[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time
before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of
statutory damages •••." 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(l) (1982). The legislative history also suggests that
the right to a late election of remedies works in only one direction: "Subsection (c) of section 504
makes clear that the plaintiffs election to recover statutory damages may take place at any time
during the trial before the court has rendered its final judgment." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1976) (emphasis added).
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This late election is not impeded by the disparity in jury trial rights
between statutory and actual relief. If the plaintiff has brought an action for actual damages, he may at the last minute change his mind
and ask the judge for statutory relief. The judge would then be justified in taking the case away from the jury. 48 It is only the reverse
decision (from statutory damages to actual damages) that is prematurely forced by the necessity of demanding a jury trial. 49 The copyright act does not guarantee the plaintiff the right to make this reverse
election as late as immediately before judgment. so
Patry's final statutory construction argument centers on the fact
that section 504(c) establishes a separate set of damages, with a higher
maximum, for willful copyright infringements.st Patry attacks the
characterization of ordinary statutory damages as equitable, based on
an assumption that such a characterization, once made, would necessarily apply to the willful infringement damages provision of section
504(c). Since the latter damages are clearly punitive, and since punitive damages have sometimes been regarded as legal, sz Patry takes issue with the characterization of the entire section as equitable.s 3
Aside from the possibility that the penal provisions may be applied
separately from the other statutory damages, s4 this argument is unpersuasive since other remedies, clearly penal in nature, have been held
properly tried before a judge. ss Thus, statutory construction again
48. Such a procedure is not "wasteful." Allowing a plaintiff to exercise a late choice between
judge and jury will present situations where a jury, having been impaneled and after viewing the
entire trial, is dismissed without ever being called upon to decide the case. But such a system
would consume no more judicial resources than a full right to jury trial, which Congress surely
could provide. Viewed from the point at which the plaintiff makes his or her decision, it does not
matter whether the judge or jury ultimately decides the case. The outlay of resources is a fixed
cost, and will be the same regardless of the plaintiff's choice.
49. If the plaintiff were allowed to change his mind at the last minute after presenting his
claim for statutory relief to the judge, the defendant would be denied the opportunity to make a
timely motion for jury trial.
50. Nothing in the statute implies that a plaintiff may elect actual damages "at any time
before final judgment is rendered." See note 47 supra.
51. If the "court" finds that the infringement was willful the maximum allowable damage
award increases to $50,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1982).
52. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) ("[T]he relief sought here - actual and
punitive damages - is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law."). However,
some courts have held that punitive damages may be properly awarded in equity. See cases cited
in note 55 infra.
53. Patry, supra note 16, at 191 ("It is simply incredible that a defendant may be held liable
for $50,000 in damages, by a fact finding of willfulness, and have this considered an equitable
proceeding.").
.
54. Even if Patry were correct that plaintiffs seeking damages greater than $10,000 must
submit to a trial by jury if the defendant requests one, ordinary statutory damage claims under
§ 504(c)(l) could still be treated as equitable.
55. Charles v. Epperson & Co., 258 Iowa 409, 137 N.W.2d 605 (1965); Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454 (Miss. 1983), discussed in Recent Decisions, Courts Are
Empowered to Award Punitive Damages, 53 Miss. L.J. 521 (1983); International Bankers Life
Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
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fails to supply a definitive answer to the question whether federal
copyright damages are properly considered legal or equitable, and
therefore to whether a seventh amendment right to trial by jury exists
in statutory damages cases.
B.

Constitutional Analysis: The Historical Test

Regardless of whether Congress intended a remedy to be legal, the
seventh amendment requires that a jury trial be made available to the
parties if that remedy bears the indicia of legal relief. 56 In Ross v.
Bernhard, 51 the Supreme Court enunciated the following three-part
test for determining whether an issue should be characterized as
"legal" or "equitable":58 "[T]he 'legal' nature of an issue is determined
by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such
questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities
and limitations of juries."59 The first two elements of this test are permutations of the traditional "historical test" 60 for characterizing cases
under the seventh amendment. The third element - the abilities of
juries - represents a possible departure from traditional analysis.61
56. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
57. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
58. Ross is only one of a series of Supreme Court cases interpreting the seventh amendment.
Two of the more famous of these, Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), and Beacon
Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), are distinguishable for present purposes because they
dealt not with characterizing a particular issue as legal or equitable, but with characterizing a
case that combines both equitable and legal issues. These cases are discussed in more detail in
Part II infra. See notes 140-47 infra and accompanying text.
59. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), the Court held that a
new statutory cause of action falls within the scope of the seventh amendment "if the statute
creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of
Jaw." 415 U.S. at 194. The Curtis court used "nature of the remedy" reasoning to conclude that
title VIII cases are legal. The court did not mention or apply the other two parts of the Ross test,
perhaps because the second part - nature of the remedy - was so clearly dispositive of the case.
In finding that section 504(c) damages were legal in nature, the Fourth Circuit in Gnossos
Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981), applied its own unique formulation of the
Curtis holding. This formulation, which had its genesis in Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d
216 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978), operated by dividing a cause of action into two
components - the rights protected and the remedy granted - each to be examined separately
and characterized as either legal or equitable. (In Gnossos the court concluded that both the
rights and the remedy were legal.)
Aside from the fact that such a test is inconsistent with the Ross test, the split into "rights"
and "remedies" adopted by the Fourth Circuit is as conclusory and unhelpful as attempts to
characterize the case as a whole. (For examples of the latter difficulty see notes 75-80 infra and
accompanying text.) Labelling an element of a cause of action a "right" or a "remedy" does little
to advance the seventh amendment inquiry; what is needed is a method for determining if a right
or a remedy is "legal." The Ross test, at least, provides a substantive answer to this question.
60. See Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 43, 44 (1980) ("The first two taken together are in effect the
historical test; the third factor is sometimes referred to as the pragmatic test.").
61. See Devlin, supra note 60, at 44.
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Pre-merger Custom

The first inquiry in the three-prong Ross test is a historical one:
whether prior to the merger of law and equity, the cause of action was
considered to be legal or equitable. Unfortunately, this historical analysis fails to yield a definitive answer to the question of whether statutory copyright damages are properly characterized as legal or
equitable. 62 Originally, the copyright remedy was one at common
law. 63 This traditional remedy was supplemented in England in the
seventeenth century by statutory copyright remedies, 64 and in
America in the eighteenth century by state statutes.65 These remedies,
too, were apparently legal in nature. 66 The first federal copyright legislation was enacted in 1790,67 and was amended periodically throughout the nineteenth century. 68 The original federal statute explicitly
provided for relief to be granted in actions at law; 69 a subsequent act
extended jurisdiction to federal equity courts over suits in which an
injunction was sought. 70
None of the Anglo-American statutory copyright enactments prior
62. The federal courts have differed over whether copyright actions were historically legal or
equitable. Compare Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that
statutory copyright damages were historically legal), with Cayman Music, Ltd. v. Reichenberger,
403 F. Supp. 794 (W.D. Wis. 1975) (holding that statutory copyright damages were historically
equitable.).
63. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-57 (1834); Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burrows
2303, 2312, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 206 (K.B. 1769). One historian has concluded that common law
copyright protection existed in England at least as early as 1662. B. BUGBEE, THE EARLY
AMERICAN LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES PATENT AND CoPYRIGHT SYSTEMS 133 (1960) (unpublished dissertation).
64. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19. This statute provided a specified amount of damages for every infringing copy.
65. CoPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BULLETIN No. 3 (REVISED), CoPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT
1-21 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS], cited in Patry, supra note 16, at
148-51. These statutes generally provided for a fixed amount of damages per copy. COPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS, supra, at 1-21.
66. See Patry, supra note 16, at 151. Seven of the twelve states with copyright enactments
specifically assigned them to a law court. Patry bases his inference that the remainder of the
state statutes were also legal on (I) the statutes' failure to grant equity jurisdiction, (2) a general
lack of equity courts in colonial America, and (3) a widespread contemporary hostility toward
chancery courts.
67. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. See Patry, supra note 16, at 155. The power to
grant copyright protection had been ceded by the states to the federal government by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 589
(1834), held that the federal copyright remedy was a new form of relief which supplanted the
common law cause of action.
68. The most significant amendments were Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 14, 4 Stat. 436; Act of
Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198; and Act of Mar. 3,
1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106. None of the 19th century amendments contained a provision for "in
lieu" damages such as later appeared in the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. See
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 65, at 24-59.
69. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
70. Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481.
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to 1909, however, provided plaintiffs with the option of an alternative
form of relief in lieu of actual damages. 71 While prior federal (and
colonial) statutes had placed minimums and maximums on the
amount to be recovered in a copyright case, these limits applied to
actual, provable damages, not to a wholly discretionary amount set by
the court. 72 It was not until 1909 that statutory damages were added
to the federal copyright statute.73 Therefore, the pre-1909 history of
copyright damages is of little relevance to the question of whether statutory damages are best characterized as legal or equitable. 74
When a modern cause of action has no 1791 (pre-seventh-amendment) counterpart, courts often rely upon the closest 1791 analogy to
11. See note 68 supra.
72. Statutory limits in the nineteenth century were applied to actual damages, under the Act
of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. In contrast, § 504(c) damages are not tied to factual loss.
Indeed, statutory copyright damages may be recovered absent any showing of loss due to the
infringement. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
73. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081, repealed by Copyrights Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-804 (1982).
74. The characteristic that distinguishes the "in lieu" statutory relief introduced in 1909
from prior copyright relief is the former's complete reliance on the discretion of the court. It is
this very feature of statutory relief that leads many observers to characterize it as an equitable
remedy. See notes 102-07 infra and accompanying text.
Though Patry argues otherwise, see Patry, supra note 16, at 173-77, his attempt to show a
string of essentially unchanged legal copyright statutes is disrupted by the 1909 act. Patry emphasizes the 1909 act's retention of several important features of the nineteenth century copyright acts, such as the provision for minimum and maximum damages and the words "as to the
court shall appear to be just." He thereby concludes that the 1909 act did not constitute a
substantial departure from earlier copyright enactments. However, Patry ignores the fact that
the 1909 act was the first copyright legislation to award statutory damages "in lieu of actual
damages," thereby removing from the amount recovered any necessary connection with factual
loss.
In support of his argument that the 1909 act did not constitute a substantial departure from
earlier copyright enactments, Patry further contends that the 1909 act merely reenacted the language of a prior statute governing damages for infringement of dramatic or musical compositions. Id. at 176. This prior statute read in pertinent part:
Any person publicly performing or representing any dramatic or musical composition for
which a copyright has been obtained, . . . shall be liable for damages therefor, such damages . . . to be assessed at such sum • . . as to the court shall appear to be just.
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 101, 16 Stat. 198, 214 (1871) (repealed 1909).
The 1909 act, on the other hand, provided in pertinent part:
[I]f any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws
. • . such person shall be liable:
. . • to pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may
have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have
made from such infringement. . • or in lieu of actual damages and profits such damages as

to the court shall appear to be just • . . .
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081, repealed by Copyrights Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-804 (1982) (emphasis added).
Although Patry argues that the above statutes are essentially the same, careful inspection of
the two acts demonstrates that only one damage provision is created by the pre-1909 law,
whereas three separate provisions are established by the 1909 act: actual damages, profits, and
"in lieu" damages. The "in lieu" clause has no counterpart in the pre-1909 act. Furthermore,
Patry makes the unsupported statement that the phrase "as to the court shall appear to be just"
in the 1909 act was intended to modify the entire section, including the provisions relating to
actual damages and profits. Patry, supra note 16, at 176. Again, careful inspection of the act
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determine if the modern action is equitable or legal.75 The Gnossos
court, for example, analogized statutory copyright damages to two
traditional common law actions: tortious interference with property
rights and the common law action for debt. 76
The court's analogy to tort law is unhelpful. Copyright actions
protect property interests, and therefore sound in tort, but this fact
does not aid in determining whether statutory copyright actions are
"legal." Tort actions - particularly property-interference tort actions
- can be either legal or equitable, depending on the relief sought. 77
Indeed, the copyright statute is a good example of this phenomenon.
If the relief sought in a copyright case is an injunction, the cause of
action is equitable;78 if actual damages or profits are sought, it is
legal. 79 The important question is how to categorize the remedy of
statutory relief; categorization of the right protected is not useful. 80
The analogy to an action for debt is more helpful - at least it
characterizes the relief sought. The Supreme Court, however, has described the action for debt as lying "whenever a sum certain is due to
the plaintiff, or a sum which can readily be reduced to a certainty. . . ." 81 But statutory damages are completely unlike a "sum
certain" - they are determined entirely at the discretion of the court,
within prescribed limits.82 Thus, the action for debt is distinguishable
from an action for statutory damages for precisely the reason that
most strongly characterizes the latter as an equitable action - its
highly discretionary nature. 83
Since statutory damages did not exist prior to the twentieth century, and since no traditional form of relief is directly analogous to
such damages, 84 the pre-merger history of copyright damages is inconclusive as to whether statutory damages should be regarded as legal or
defeats Patry's contentions. The phrase "as to the court shall appear to be just" is intended to
modify only "such damages" as may be awarded in lieu of actual damages and profits.
Patry's statutory construction arguments are thus unpersuasive. The 1909 act's "in lieu"
damages did not represent a reenactment of traditional legal copyright relief, but rather a wholly
novel discretionary remedy.
1S. See, e.g., In re Vorpahl, 69S F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1982) (analogizing ERISA actions to
ancient actions for abuse of trust); Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981)
(analogizing copyright damages to the ancient action for debt). See also Redish, supra note 7, at
491.
76. See Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 1981).
11. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, SS0 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting),
78. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith, 64S F.2d 6, 7 (5th Cir. 1981).
19. See Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 212-13 (2d Cir. 1983).
80. An action for nuisance, for example, can be brought in equity if the plaintiff seeks an
injunction, and at law if the plaintiff seeks damages. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 89 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984); D. DOBBS, supra note 32, § 2.5, at 59.
81. Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 542 (1871) (emphasis added).
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1982); text at note 25 supra.
83. See note 32 supra.
84. See notes 63-74 supra and accompanying text.
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equitable. Guidance must therefore be sought in the second and third
prongs of the test enunciated in Ross v. Bernhard. 85
2. Nature of the Remedy

The second prong of the Ross test inquires whether the remedy
sought is fundamentally equitable or legal in nature. 86 This inquiry
presupposes, of course, that specific factors can be identified as "fundamentally" characteristic of equitable or legal remedies. Although
the validity of this assumption is disputed, 87 courts have adopted generalizations that purport to identify the primary characteristics of equitable and legal relief. 88 In the context of statutory damages, the two
most important characterizations are the general associations of monetary relief with legal jurisdiction,89 and of "discretionary" relief with
equitable jurisdiction.90 An analysis of these factors leads to the conclusion that statutory copyright damages are best characterized as
equitable.
The strongest factor weighing in favor of characterizing statutory
copyright damages as "legal" is that they provide for monetary relief.
Money damages have generally been associated with legal jurisdiction, 91 unlike specific performance, which has typically been associ85. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). See text at notes 57-61 supra.
86. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
87. See, e.g.• 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 639 (London 1869) ("It is impossible to give any idea of [English equity], in general or abstract expressions. . . . In order to
explain to a foreigner the nature of English equity, it would be necessary to enumerate all the
cases in which the Chancellor had interposed to supply or correct the defects of the law administered by the Common Law Courts. The notion that there is any essential or necessary distinction
is the merest absurdity.").
88. See notes 102-07 infra and accompanying text..
89. See note 91 infra and accompanying text.
90. See note 32 supra. The objection might be raised that associating "discretion" with equity jurisdiction is as formalistic a distinction as that between equity and law, a distinction criticized elsewhere in this Note. See notes 123-35 infra and accompanying text. That is, juries
necessarily exercise great discretion in inferring "facts" from evidence and in other areas, and
judges in practice apply their own versions of facts in making necessary determinations from the
bench.
Nevertheless, jurors were historically thought of as deciding rigidly defined issues of fact,
which would then be "plugged into" legal formulae explained by the judge. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 1] 25,059, at 15,311 (N.D. Ind.
1979). Since the prevailing interpretation of the seventh amendment demands an inquiry into
how a modern cause of action would have been characterized historically, see notes 50-54 supra
and accompanying text, the modern jurist must apply distinctions recognized historically,
whether those distinctions now seem formal or not. As defined by the historical approach, analysis under the seventh amendment must be limited to modes of thought accepted at the time of the
amendment's adoption. That those modes of thought may not have been rational is irrelevant to
this analysis.
For purposes of this Part of the Note - that is, for purposes of characterizing statutory
copyright relief as legal or equitable - the historical test is accepted as the appropriate standard
in spite of its inadequacies. For a proposal to minimize the pernicious effects of the historical
test, see Part II infra.
91. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)
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ated with equitable jurisdiction.92 The force of this argument is
limited, however, by two historical characteristics of equity and legal
courts. First, equity courts were traditionally authorized to grant
monetary relief, provided such relief was "restitutionary."93 Second,
traditional legal relief, though monetary, was never associated with the
degree of discretion conferred by section 504(c). 94
Two courts have held that statutory copyright damages, which
seek to restore (albeit roughly)95 the copyright owner to the position
he or she occupied prior to the infringement, can be regarded as "restitutionary. "96 Indeed, statutory damages have been likened to the
backpay remedy of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964, 97 which
lower courts have consistently held to be restitutionary and therefore
1125,059, at 15,310 (N.D. Ind. 1979) ("Monetary relief is generally provided by courts of law.").
See also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) ("The relief sought here - actual and
punitive damages - is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law."); E. STASON,
supra note 1, at 88 (noting that a decree at law was an award of money, or, in some cases,
possession of property).
92. H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 126-27 (1948). Indeed, a requirement for
granting equitable relief is that legal (monetary) relief be inadequate. D. DOBBS, supra note 32,
§ 2.5, at 57.
93. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974); D. DOBBS, supra note 32, § 4.1, at 222-23
(observing that restitution may be appropriate in either a legal or equitable proceeding); David•
son, The Equitable Remedy of Compensation, 13 MELD. U. L. REv. 349 (1982) (arguing that
restitution - or "compensation," as the author terms such relief - has always been available at
equity). See also notes 96-98 infra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 99-107 infra and accompanying text.
95. See note 97 infra.
96. See Glazier v. First Media Corp., 532 F. Supp. 63 (D. Del. 1982); Broadcast Musk, Inc.
v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 CoPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 1125,059, at 15,311 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
"Restitution" has historically been defined as that measure of damages that will restore the plaintiff to the position he or she would have occupied had it not been for the defendant's actions.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1180 (5th ed. 1979). See D. DOBBS, supra note 32, § 4.1 at 222.
Alternatively, "restitution" has been used to describe the measure of damages owed by a defendant who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY at
1180; RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrurloN §§ 1-2 (1937). Both definitions - particularly the latter
- aptly describe the purpose and effect of copyright damages.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). This comparison is made, for example, in Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 CoPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 11 25,059, at 15,311 (N.D.
Ind. 1979).
Patry rejects the analogy between statutory damages and the backpay provisions of title VII.
Patty, supra note 16, at 189. He distinguishes the two forms of relief on the grounds that (1) unlike copyright claims, claims of racial discrimination under title VII can often evoke racial prejudice among jurors; and (2) unlike backpay, "statutory copyright damages are not in the nature of
restitution" because they are imprecise. Id.
Patry's first point of differentiation is well taken. It is likely that courts holding title VII
cases to be equitable have been influenced by the risk of racial prejudice among potential jurors.
Patry fails to show, however, why statutory copyright damages and backpay are not both "restitutionary." The mere fact that § 504(c) damages are not a precise measure of a plaintifrs loss
does not mean that they are not restitutionary. The very purpose of such relief is to provide
restoration of a plaintiffs loss when the actual loss is difficult to prove. See note 96 supra.
Backpay damages may be more precise than § 504(c) damages, but precision is not a necessary
element of "restitution."
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equitable.98
More important, traditional legal damages were either tied to a
specific factual loss (the "facts" to be determined by the jury) or were
punitive in nature. 99 Statutory copyright damages are not punitive unless brought under the provisions of section 504(d). 100 Moreover, they
are not tied to any factual loss, but rather depend solely on the court's
determination of a ''just" level of damages within the statutory
limits.101
This degree of discretion is an element foreign to actions at law, 102
and is one of the features seized on by both courts and commentators
as especially characteristic of equity jurisdiction. 103 Several courts, labelling particular forms of statutory relief as equitable, have based
their decisions in large part on the appearance of the word "discretion" in the statute. 104 To be sure, some commentators have argued
against associating discretion solely with equity jurisdiction, asserting
that law judges were also historically invested with a certain amount
of discretion. 105 As a general proposition, however, "discretion" is
certainly more closely associated with equity than with law. 106 Further, it appears settled that discretion is an appropriate factor to be
taken into account in characterizing a cause of action for purposes of
the seventh amendment. 107
98. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974), and cases cited therein; see also Slack
v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975).
99. See note 91 supra; D. DOBBS, supra note 32, § 3.2, at 138-39 (pointing out that legal
damages are generally measured by reference to some value). That legal damages are intended to
be tied to factual loss is evidenced by the legal rule that damages not proved with reasonable
certainty are not recoverable. See Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 396 Mich. 639, 643-44, 242
N.W.2d 372, 373-74 (1976).
100. Statutory damages have been held not punitive in nature. L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 107-08 (1919). In any event, even damages that are concededly
punitive may be regarded as equitable. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
101. It may be argued that the court must still find the "fact" of infringement. However, this
kind of "fact" (liability) must be found in all equitable (and legal) cases. What distinguishes legal
, cases is the "factual" nature of the remedy, as contrasted with the "discretionary" nature of
equitable remedies. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 549-50 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting),
for a similar argument.
102. J. POMEROY, POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE§ 109 (4th ed. 1918) ("The distinguishing characteristics oflegal remedies are their uniformity, their unchangeableness or fixedness, their lack of adaptation to circumstances, and the technical rules which govern their use.").
103. See note 32 supra.
104. See, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 1957); Glazier
v. First Media Corp., 532 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D. Del. 1982); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's,
Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 1J 25,059, at 15,311 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
105. See Redish, supra note 7, at 529; Comment, The Right to Jury Trial Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment and Fair Labor Standards Acts, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 365, 374 n.57
(1977) [hereinafter cited as CHICAGO Comment]; Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil
Rights Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 503, 523-24 (1973).
106. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974); see also note 32 supra. For a response
to the argument that the association of discretion with equity is formalistic, see note 90 supra.
107. The Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974), implied that the
discretion permitted in granting relief is relevant in characterizing the relief as equitable.
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The 1974 Supreme Court holding in Curtis v. Loether 108 lends support to the foregoing analysis. Curtis involved a plaintiff's suit for
·damages and injunctive relief pursuant to Title VIII (the Fair Housing
provision) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 109 The Court held that the
damages sought, described by the plaintiff as actual and punitive, were
"legal" in nature and hence within the purview of the seventh amendment.110 However, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, carefully distinguished the plaintiff's cause of action from title VII suits for
job reinstatement and backpay, which lower courts had consistently
held to be equitable.1 11 Not all monetary statutory relief was "legal,"
he noted. Title VII backpay was restitutionary in nature, and the authorizing statutory language ("as the court deems appropriate") invested the factfinder with greater discretion than did title VIII
provisions. 112
Section 5O4(c) copyright relief, like title VII relief, has been characterized as "restitutionary" in nature. 113 In addition, the copyright
statute invests the fact-finder with great discretion in determining section 5O4(c) damages. 114 Applying the reasoning of Curtis v. Loether,
statutory copyright damages are analogous to title VII backpay damages.115 Characterization of statutory damages as "equitable" is therefore entirely consistent with Curtis, and is the correct result under the
second prong of the Ross test.
3. Abilities of Juries
The third prong of the Ross test concerns the "abilities and limitations of juries." 116 Under this leg of the test, a cause of action is more
likely to be considered equitable if it typically raises issues too complex
for the average juror to comprehend and decide fairly.1 17
This final leg of the Ross test does not aid in determining whether
statutory copyright damages are properly considered legal or equitable. Admittedly, the issues involved in determining whether an infringement has occurred and what damages are appropriate are not
108. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
109. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1982).
110. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-96.
111. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196-97.
112. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197.
113. See notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
115. See note 97 supra.
116. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,538 n.10 (1970). See also notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
117. See Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528, 529-30 (D. Conn. 1977)
(holding case to be "legal" since, inter alia, issues were not overly complicated for jury). See also
Redish, supra note 7, at 523-25, concerning the impact of the third prong.
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generally of a prohibitively complex nature, 118 suggesting that copyright damages should always be regarded as legal. However, the third
prong of the Ross test, as it has been applied, works in only one direction. That is, if a case is too complex for a jury, it is considered equitable; but if it is within the grasp of a jury, it is considered also to be
within the grasp of a judge, and the test is inconclusive. 119
On the other hand, even if statutory copyright issues were very
complicated, the same issues would be raised in suits for actual damages, which have always been considered legal. 120 Therefore, the complexity factor cannot operate to make statutory damages equitable,
without operating to make all copyright damages equitable. The third
prong of the Ross test has not received a sufficiently positive response
by lower courts to justify a change in the accepted characterization of
actual damages. 121 This prong of the Ross test is thus not helpful in
determining whether issues within the competence of both judge and
jury should be characterized as legal or equitable, and is therefore not
determinative in the context of statutory copyright damages.
In sum, neither the first nor the third element of the Ross inquiry
answers the question of whether statutory damages are legal or equitable.122 Therefore, the second element of the test - the nature of the
remedy - is determinative. Statutory damages are highly discretionary and do not bear any necessary relationship to factual loss. These
characteristics are more consistent with equitable than with legal jurisdiction and suggest that statutory damages are best characterized as
equitable. Accordingly, no right to a jury trial should exist in cases
brought to recover statutory copyright damages.
118. See Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528, 530 (D. Conn. 1977).
119. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)
1125,059, at 15,310 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528,
530 (D. Conn. 1977). This analysis is to be distinguished from a second test, used when the
remedy is clearly legal. In such a case, if the issues are not overly complex, the jury will try the
case (since the remedy is a legal one). The present discussion seeks to identify the statutory cause
of actlon as legal or equitable, a different inquiry.
120. The question ofliability is the same in suits for actual and statutory damages. The issue
of calculating damages, however, is more complicated in actual damages cases than in statutory
damages cases. Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528,530 (D. Conn. 1977).
Thus, if a statutory damages case is too complex to be presented to a jury, the same is true of an
actual damages case brought on identical facts.
121. For example, only one of the cases considering the seventh amendment's application to
§ 504(c) relief has even acknowledged the third prong of the Ross test. In Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Papa John's, Inc., 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 11 25,059, at 15,310 (N.D. Ind. 1979),
the court concluded that the issue was within the competence of both judge and jury, so that the
test was inconclusive.
122. The same conclusion was reached in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 197881 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 11 25,059 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR LIMITING THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT'S SCOPE

The problem of characterizing section 504(c) damages is merely
one example of the difficulties faced by federal courts under the prevailing interpretation of the seventh amendment. 123 Related problems
of allocating jury trials and classifying causes of action have led many
observers to decry the antiquated practice of granting the right to jury
trial only in cases that would have been characterized as "legal" in
1791. 124 Due to the clear language of the seventh amendment, the
historical approach is largely unavoidable. 125 Courts retain greater
latitude, however, in classifying new causes of action such as section
504(c) damages. When confronted with causes of action that did not
exist in 1791, courts may define "law" narrowly, and "equity"
broadly, without doing violence to either the Constitution or settled
Supreme Court doctrine. 126 Such an approach would minimize the
number of cases in which the seventh amendment mandates an absolute right to a jury trial, and maximize the number of cases in which
rational, utilitarian decisions could be made about whether to provide
a jury trial.
That the seventh amendment produces interpretative problems and
leads to an irrational allocation of the right to jury trials has been
widely recognized. 127 Were it not for the seventh amendment, the antiquated distinction between law and equity would have greatly declined in significance. 128 Today, the most important reason for the
continued existence of an equity/law distinction is the allocation of
jury trials. Unfortunately, cases are assigned the "legal" or "equitable" label for reasons wholly unrelated to the jury question.
As the situation now stands, a party's right to a jury trial in a civil
case depends upon whether the cause of action would have been characterized as "legal" or "equitable" in 1791. Perhaps the most dis123. Other examples include seventh amendment law/equity questions arising out of ERISA
actions, In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1982); employment discrimination cases, Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); and fair housing cases, Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
124. See Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment, 81 MICH, L. REV, 1571,
1575 (1983); James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 664 (1963); Redish,
supra note 7, at 486-87.
125. See James, supra note 124, at 664 (conceding that the historical test is a necessary result
of the seventh amendment's language, but arguing that courts should exercise greater flexibility
in applying that test).
126. Such an approach would not be inconsistent with recent Supreme Court rulings. See
notes 140-47 infra and accompanying text.
127. See note 124 supra and accompanying text.
128. See E. STAS0N, supra note 1, at 90. The distinction remains in two other areas of the
law. First, the right to "equitable" relief (an injunction) is still based on the inadequacy of
"legal" relief (money damages). Second, the scope of appellate review is still affected by whether
the issue is legal or equitable. Id.
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turbing aspect of this method of allocating jury trials is that,
historically, the suitability of a case for jury trial was not an important
factor in determining whether an emerging cause of action fell within
equitable or legal jurisdiction. 129 As Professor James has noted,
whether a case came to be equitable rather than legal frequently had
more to do with the evidentiary, procedural, or relief-granting capabilities of equity than with the appropriateness of the case for judicial
determination. 130 In some instances, equity's jurisdiction over a case
depended simply on the Chancellor's political influence at a particular
time.131
Even if it were rational to allocate civil jury trials according to
whether a case was historically "legal" or "equitable," deciding into
which category a case fits is difficult. 132 Authorities have remarked on
more than one occasion that "equity" is impossible to define descriptively.133 An attempt to categorize a case according to whether its
closest 1791 analogue was considered equitable or legal may prove
equally fruitless, since no guidelines for choosing the "closest" analogue are satisfactory. As the discussion of section 5O4(c) damages
suggests, the "closest" analogue may be equitable or legal, depending
on whether it is chosen according to the type of right being protected,
the type of relief being provided, or any number of other factors. 134
The seventh amendment as it is now interpreted thus perpetuates an
irrational and unworkable system for allocating jury trials. 135
129. James, supra note 124, at 661 ("At no time in history was the line dividing equity from
law altogether - or even largely - the product of a rational choice between issues which were
better suited to court or to jury trial.").
130. James, supra note 124, at 661-63. One English writer has expressed dismay at how the
historic dichotomy is used in America: "There seemed to me to be something surprisingly obsolete about deciding upon the mode of trial, not as the Supreme Court had hinted in 1970 by
reference to 'the practical abilities and limitations of juries' but by reference to a line reached in
another country . . . nearly two centuries before." Devlin, supra note 124, at 1575. Lord Devlin
has urged that some of the more unfortunate consequences of the seventh amendment can be
avoided by applying the doctrine, known to English equity in 1791, that even clearly legal cases
are to be tried in equity if the case is too complex for a jury to comprehend. Id. at 1599-605.
131. w. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-63 (1922), quoted in E. STASON,
supra note 1, at 77-81 (relating the highlights of the long-running struggle between the Chancellor and the King's Bench).
132. James, supra note 124, at 668 ("[H]istory is sometimes equivocal."). See also note 87

supra.
133. The words of Professor Maitland are particularly apt:
[W]e are driven to say that Equity now is that body of rules administered by our English
courts of justice which, were it not for the operation of the Judicature Acts, would be administered only by those courts which would be known as Courts of Equity.
This, you may well say, is but a poor thing to call a definition. • . . Still I fear that
nothing better than this is possible.
F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 1 (1936), quoted in E. STASON, supra note 1, at 72. See also note 87

supra.
134. See text at notes 75-80 supra.
135. The problems caused by the seventh amendment's historical approach to jury allocation
have led to numerous proposals for reform more extreme than that proposed in this Note. See,
e.g., James, supra note 124, at 690 (proposal to take post-1791 trends into account); Redish,
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The constitutional mandate that "the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved" 136 requires a principled allocation of that right to new
causes of action, not a rigid historical inquiry. To that end, this Note
proposes a straightforward solution that should prove effective: courts
should interpret "equity" more broadly when defining newly created
statutory causes of action. When a new statutory cause of action is
neither clearly legal nor clearly equitable, and no pre-1791 analogy
seems determinative, that cause of action should be regarded as equitable. Such a policy would limit the cases in which the seventh amendment requires a jury trial, thus leaving more cases free for legislative
determination of the appropriateness of jury trial. 137
This approach does not do violence to the constitutional guarantee
of the right to a jury trial in civil cases. 138 A broadened definition of
equity would affect only those few causes of action that have been
newly created by Congress, and that seem ~o fit neither the "legal" nor
the "equitable" definition. The historical argument that the framers
"intended" to guarantee the right to a jury trial is weakest in a case of
this type. A broad judicial definition of equity would simply allow
supra note 7, at 517 (proposal to interpret seventh amendment strictly); CHICAGO Comment,
supra note 105, at 365 (proposal to take the abilities of juries into account to a greater extent),
Perhaps the most striking suggestion was Professor Redish's proposal to interpret the seventh
amendment quite narrowly: "One possible means of employing the historical approach to
achieve much the same flexibility would be to reject all forms of the rational approach.•.• [A]
rigid historical approach would • . . dictate that, unless the actual substantive cause of action
existed in 1791, the seventh amendment does not guarantee a right to jury trial.").
136. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
137. The seventh amendment only "preserves" the right to jury trial in legal cases. Since the
amendment makes no provision for cases not considered legal, Congress is free to decide whether
or not to provide jury trials in such cases. Thus, defining "equity" broadly increases the number
of actions for which Congress may decide the appropriateness of providing a jury trial, and
decreases the number of actions in which a right to jury trial is rigidly required by the Constitution.
· The legislature could make the jury trial requirement in a given type of case depend upon, for
example, the nature and complexity of the issues to be decided, whether a need exists for uniform
case-by-case results, and whether the remedy is to be applied so as to fit consistently within a
broader legislative scheme. Professor Redish has made a similar, albeit more extreme proposal.
See note 135 supra.
138. Robert Patry, in his discussion of copyright damages, has expressed concern over suggestions that the scope of the seventh amendment be narrowed:
The right to a jury is one of our most cherished rights. It cannot be denied on the grounds
of expediency, or on the ground that judges are allegedly more flexible or just than juries.
The reasons our forefathers fought for the right to a jury are as valid today as they ever
were.
Patry, supra note 16, at 194.
It appears, however, that the institution of civil jury trial is not considered quite the prized
tradition it once was. Attacks on the efficacy and fairness of the civil jury have been heard from
several quarters in the last half-century. The most famous of these attacks was unleashed by
Judge Frank, who complained that "a better instrument than the usual jury trial could scarcely
be imagined for achieving uncertainty, capriciousness, lack of uniformity, disregard of the [rules],
and unpredictability of decisions." J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 123 (1949). Jury trials also
have been blamed for much of the delay plaguing the modem federal court system. Hazard,
Book Review, 48 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 360 (1960), cited in Redish, supra note 7, at 506 n.84; Peck, Do
Juries Delay Justice?, 18 F.R.D. 455 (1956).
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Congress to allocate jury trials on a more rational basis than does the
present equitable/legal distinction. 139
The proposed approach is also not inconsistent with established
Supreme Court policy. At first glance, a restrictive interpretation of
the seventh amendment would appear to run counter to the Supreme
Court's opinions in Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 140 Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood, 141 and Ross v. Bernhard, 142 which support expansion of the
right to trial by jury. 143 However, these three cases dealt not with the
characterization of a new cause of action as equitable or legal, but with
the jury trial consequences when recognizable equitable and legal issues were presented in the same case. 144 The very most that can be
said for the applicability of these cases to the characterization of new
causes of action is that they reflect a general bias on the Court's part in
favor of expanding the seventh amendment's scope. Such an interpre139. See notes 127-37 supra and accompanying text.
140. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
141. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
142. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
143. See generally Patry, supra note 16, at 181-85 (relating Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen
to the statutory copyright damages dispute).
144. In Beacon Theatres, the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the defendant's filing of
an antitrust claim. The defendant responded by counterclaiming with an antitrust count. 359
U.S. at 502-03. The Court held that the legal claim (the antitrust count) had to be tried to the
jury before the equitable claim (the injunction) could be decided by the judge. Otherwise, reasoned the Court, the judge's ruling on the injunction might bar the defendant's antitrust claim by
resjudicata, thereby depriving defendant of his right to a jury trial on that claim. 359 U.S. at 50708. Beacon Theatres is directly applicable, therefore, only to the issue of deciding the order of
trial when recognizable equitable and legal claims are found in the same action. It does not speak
to the issue of defining a new cause of action as "equitable" or "legal."
The same may be said for Dairy Queen, decided three years later. The plaintiff corporation in
that case had sought a judgment for money damages, but had characterized its plea as one for an
"accounting." The Court held that this characterization did not alter the legal nature of the
claim. 369 U.S. at 477-78. The Court also ruled that the defendant retained its right to have legal
issues tried to a jury despite the lower court's characterization of those issues as "incidental" to
equitable ones present in the same case. 369 U.S. at 473.
In Ross, the Court held that a shareholders' derivative suit carried the right to a jury trial in
certain instances. 396 U.S. at 539. Though shareholders' derivative suits had traditionally been
considered equitable, the Court reasoned that with the advent of the Federal Rules, these cases
could be divided into two subdivisions: (1) the stockholders' right to sue on behalf of the corporation, and (2) the corporation's claim against the defendants. The Court held that in those cases
in which the latter claim could properly be described as "legal" the parties would be entitled to
trial by jury. 396 U.S. at 539.
The dissenting opinion in Ross argued that the majority was not truly determining the disposition of two separate causes of action, but rather redefining one general cause of action: the
shareholders' derivative suit. 396 U.S. at 549 (Stewart, J., dissenting). If this description of the
majority's reasoning were accurate, the case would stand as authority for defining "legal" causes
of action broadly. But the majority in Ross saw itself as allocating the factfinding function between several distinct causes of action. 396 U.S. at 539.
Therefore Ross, like Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, is not applicable to the classification
of a new cause of action such as the statutory copyright remedy. The latter problem, in fact, is
fundamentally different from that presented in those three cases. The question of whether a single
new cause of action is equitable or legal cannot be resolved simply by splitting the case up. This
question, rather, involves a determination of how to categorize one issue that may possess both
equitable and legal characteristics.
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tation would, however, read too much into the Court's opinions. 145
As various other Supreme Court opinions illustrate, the Court has
been willing to narrow the scope of the seventh amendment in appropriate situations. 146 Moreover, even if a pro-jury bias has colored the
Court's decisions in cases involving both legal and equitable issues,
that bias would not necessarily extend to the separate issue of classifying new causes of action.
In this limited area - categorization of new causes of action - the
Court has been all but silent. 147 Thus, a policy of defining "equity"
broadly in such cases would violate no settled constitutional interpretation. Indeed, such a policy would lend coherence to seventh amendment doctrine by ameliorating some of the problems caused by the
perpetuation of the antiquated equitable/legal distinction.
CONCLUSION

Parties in dispute over whether statutory copyright damages are
legal or equitable have burdened the federal courts with numerous
cases and many appeals. 148 As in other instances of litigation engendered by the seventh amendment, however, the underlying issue is not
really whether the cases are legal or equitable, but whether the parties
have the right to a jury trial.
The available evidence indicates that the statutory copyright damages remedy is properly considered equitable. But even if this result
were not so clear, a policy of defining this and other ambiguous causes
of action as equitable would help reduce the irrelevant arguments, and
the irrational results, produced by an unduly broad interpretation of
the seventh amendment.
- Andrew W. Stumpff

145. The Court has not argued from the premise that the seventh amendment is to be interpreted broadly. Rather, in these cases the Court has found that procedural barriers that had
prevented application of the amendment have been removed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court has not extended the definition of what cases are to be called "legal," but
instead has merely recognized the rules' potential for separating concededly legal claims from
concededly equitable ones.
146. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commn,, 430 U.S.
442 (1977) (denying right to jury trial in OSHA hearing); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966)
(denying right to jury trial in bankruptcy case).
147. Only Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), and Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974), have touched on this issue. In passing, Ross mentioned a three-part test that deviates
only slightly from the historical test. See notes 57-61 supra and accompanying text. Curlis
stands as authority for characterizing statutory copyright damages as equitable. See notes 108-15
supra and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., note 23 supra.

